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INTRODUCTION
Professor Jean Sternlight has written about the need for examining the integrated nature and relationship between alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
and civil procedure.1 ADR and civil procedure are integrated in practice, but
unfortunately, these two fields are commonly viewed and studied separately in
the legal academy.2 When one takes an integrated approach in studying the
fields of civil procedure and ADR, common, underlying themes come to light,
and this integrated approach can broaden our understanding of procedural justice and the multiple purposes of our justice system.3 Similarly, Professor Deborah Hensler and Damira Khatam, as part of this symposium volume, have
written a persuasive article demonstrating the value of examining different domains of arbitration in a more comprehensive, broad manner.4
Inspired by Professor Sternlight’s work and the symposium contribution of
Professor Hensler and Damira Khatam, this article examines arbitration law
through a broader framework—the framework of procedure. The main thesis of
this article is that one can develop a better understanding of arbitration law by
viewing arbitration as part of a broader, procedural framework for dispute resolution. The first section of this article explores a problematic tension in arbitration cases from the Supreme Court of the United States. As explained below,
from case-to-case and sometimes even within a case, the Supreme Court flipflops in its conceptualization of arbitration. However, as explained in the second part of this article, one can easily resolve this tension in the Supreme
Court’s arbitration decisions by situating arbitration law within a broader procedural framework. The final part of this article stresses the importance of analyzing arbitration through a broader procedural lens. There are several lessons
about arbitration that one can observe by focusing on the procedural nature of
arbitration. For example, by examining the role of procedure in a legal system
and examining the differences between substance-specific and transsubstantive
models of procedural regulation, one can learn important lessons about arbitration law. An exploration of arbitration through a broader lens of procedure suggests ways to improve arbitration law and redefine the meaning of arbitration in
our laws. This Article proposes that courts should interpret the meaning of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act by using a definition of arbitration that
incorporates procedural principles.

1

Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal
Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 681 (2005).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 710, 716.
4
See Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the
Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and
Public Adjudication, 18 Nev. L.J. 381, 381 (2018).
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THE FAULT LINES IN THE SUPREME COURT’S ARBITRATION CASES

There is significant tension in arbitration law because the Supreme Court
of the United States has been inconsistent in its treatment or conceptualization
of arbitration. The Court in some cases conceptualizes the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement as a substantive right. Yet, in other cases, the Court appears to re-conceptualize the enforcement of an arbitration agreement in an entirely different manner, as a procedural right. The Court has even vacillated between its different views of arbitration within the same case.
A. The Supreme Court Sometimes Conceptualizes the Enforcement of An
Arbitration Agreement as a Substantive Right
In a series of preemption decisions spanning over several decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly treated the enforcement of an arbitration agreement
as a substantive right. In its landmark decision of Southland Corp. v. Keating in
1984, which involved state court proceedings in a franchise dispute, the applicable state law guaranteed a judicial forum for the resolution of franchise disputes.5 As a result of this state law, state courts refused to enforce arbitration
agreements in connection with alleged violations of state franchise laws.6 The
Supreme Court, however, held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7 applies
in state court proceedings and preempted state laws banning arbitration, and as
a result, the arbitration agreements at issue were fully enforceable under the
FAA with respect to the franchise disputes.8 In order to reach its preemption
conclusion, the Supreme Court in Southland characterized the enforcement of
arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA as “a substantive rule applicable in
state as well as federal courts.”9
As textual support for its Southland holding, the Court selectively focused
on certain language from section two of the FAA,10 which generally states that
an arbitration agreement is fully binding.11 By narrowly focusing on this particular language of the statute, and ignoring the rest of the statute, the Court
claimed to discover only two limitations regarding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement under the FAA: first, the agreement to arbitrate must be part
of a contract involving interstate commerce, and second, arbitration agreements
5

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1984).
Id. at 5.
7
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
8
Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 10–16.
11
9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
6
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may be revocable upon generally-applicable grounds for the revocation of any
contract, such as fraud or unconscionability.12 By narrowly focusing on this
part of the statute and by claiming to see only two restrictions, which did not
impact the issue at hand, the Court hastily jumped to its conclusion that the
FAA contains no limits regarding its application in state courts, and thus, the
FAA applies in state courts.13 In conceptualizing the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as a substantive right, the Court also cited the plenary authority
of Congress, pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.14 The Court explained that the FAA “rests on the authority of Congress to
enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.”15 Thus, the enforcement
of an arbitration agreement pursuant to the FAA is a substantive right, which
state courts must respect pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.16 In the decades following the Southland decision, the Supreme Court relied on Southland in several cases to hold that one’s right to enforce an arbitration agreement, as a substantive right under federal law, overrides conflicting
state laws.17
B. The Supreme Court Sometimes Conceptualizes the Enforcement of An
Arbitration Agreement as a Procedural Right
Interspersed among the Supreme Court’s rulings characterizing the FAA as
substantive law are other, conflicting Supreme Court decisions treating the
12

Southland, 465 U.S. at 10–11 (“We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of
arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.” (emphasis added)). There
are other requirements or limitations in Section 2 of the FAA, which the Court conveniently
overlooked in Southland and in future cases. According to 9 U.S.C. § 2, the FAA’s coverage
is limited to written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract.” Statutory claims, such as the ones at issue in Southland, do not
necessarily arise out of a contract, and thus, the FAA should not apply to such claims. The
FAA was originally designed for commercial, contractual disputes, not statutory claims. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has overlooked this important limitation in the text of the
statute.
13
Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
14
Id. at 11.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 11–16.
17
For example, in Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 531 (2012), the
Court addressed a state court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement because of a state
law forbidding the use of arbitration agreements in connection with wrongful death claims
against nursing homes. Relying on the principle established in Southland that both “[s]tate
and federal courts must enforce the [FAA],” the Court in Marmet easily concluded that the
right to enforce arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA overrides the conflicting state
law banning arbitration. Id. at 530, 533. Similarly, in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489
(1987), the Court described the FAA as “a body of federal substantive law . . . enforceable in
both state and federal courts,” and the Court held that the FAA preempts a state law forbidding arbitration in wage disputes. In several other cases, the Court has relied on the substantive nature of the FAA to apply the FAA in a state court proceeding in order to oust state
law. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
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FAA as procedural law. The year after the Court decided Southland, the Court
issued a landmark decision characterizing the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement as procedural. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., the Court explained that through an agreement to arbitrate, “a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by [a] statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”18 In
Mitsubishi, the Court treated the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as a
procedural right, with no impact on substantive rights. As explained by the
Court in Mitsubishi, when parties agree to arbitrate, the parties are merely
“trad[ing] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”19 Similarly, in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., the Court characterized an agreement to arbitrate as a procedural tool to resolve the rights of the parties under substantive law: “An
agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind
of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”20 Also, in EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement “only determines the choice of forum” for resolving a
dispute about one’s substantive rights.21 Thus, in a series of several cases spanning decades, the Court has conceptualized the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement as procedural in nature.22
As the above examples illustrate, the Supreme Court has vacillated in its
treatment of arbitration from case-to-case, and there is both a procedural and
substantive strand of arbitration decisions from the Court. From the 1980s to
present day, the Court has intermittently treated the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as a substantive right, as in Southland, Perry, and Marmet.
However, interspersed among this substantive line of cases are other cases, like
Mitsubishi, Scherk, and Waffle House, where the Supreme Court has embraced
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as a mere procedural tool to define
or determine substantive rights, without impacting substantive rights.
C. Explaining the Court’s Inconsistent Conceptualization of Arbitration
How can one explain the Court’s flip-flopping treatment of arbitration over
the years? A cynical explanation is that the Court, primarily since the 1980s,
has been expanding the FAA beyond its original, intended coverage, perhaps as

18

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
Id.
20
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
21
EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) (emphasis added).
22
See also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009) (conceptualizing the enforcement
of an arbitration agreement as merely a procedural tool or a process geared towards the resolution of an underlying merits dispute, which is the focus of the inquiry regarding subject
matter jurisdiction under the FAA).
19
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a way to alleviate overcrowded judicial dockets and limit access to courts.23 To
help support the expansion of the FAA, it appears that the Court will flip-flop
and utilize either characterization regarding the enforcement of an arbitration
clause—be it procedural or substantive—so long as that characterization allows
the Court to reach its ultimate goal of expanding the FAA in that particular
case. For example, in some of the Court’s procedural cases like Mitsubishi, the
Court expanded the FAA beyond contractual disputes to cover statutory claims
of a public nature.24 Before this period of expansion, the FAA was historically
used to facilitate the arbitration of contractual claims, not statutory claims.25
However, in a series of decisions such as Mitsubishi and Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, it became clear that the Court sought to expand the
FAA beyond contractual claims to cover statutory claims.26 To help justify the
expansion of the FAA regarding the arbitrability of statutory claims, it was important for the Court to treat the enforcement of arbitration agreements as a
procedural right. It was important in these cases regarding arbitrability for the
Court to portray the FAA as broadly-applicable procedural law of a transsubstantive nature. In other words, to make this new pill regarding the arbitrability
of statutory claims easier to swallow, the Court sugarcoated the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement as merely procedural and as having no impact on substantive rights.27 The Court’s procedural characterization in Mitsubishi and similar cases, in other words, may help convey a sentiment such as the following:
there is no need to worry about expanding the FAA beyond contractual claims
to cover the resolution of statutory claims because arbitration is merely procedural; enforcing an arbitration agreement will not impact important statutory or
substantive rights, like securities or civil rights claims, because arbitration is
merely a neutral process to resolve such claims.
However, in other cases where there is a state law potentially curtailing the
use of arbitration, where the Court desired to justify the expansion of the FAA
into the states, the Court recasts the enforcement of an arbitration agreement as
a substantive right, which thereby enables the Court to hold that the state law is
preempted.28 Thus, one possible explanation of the Court’s flip-flopping treat23

IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—
INTERNATIONALIZATION, 172 (1992) (“One cannot immerse oneself in the arbitration cases
without coming to the conclusion that a major force driving the Court is docket-clearing pure
and simple.”).
24
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627–28.
25
IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS
IN AMERICA (2013).
26
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627–28; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
238 (1987).
27
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (“[A] party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by
[a] statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”);
see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 314 n.10 (2002) (“We have held that
federal statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements that are enforceable
pursuant to the FAA because the agreement only determines the choice of forum.”).
28
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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ment of arbitration is that the Court appears to engage in a chameleon-like reconceptualization of arbitration depending on whether the particular conceptualization assists the Court in justifying its ultimate conclusion, which is typically a judicial re-writing or expansion of the scope of arbitration law in furtherance of a court-manufactured policy in favor of arbitration.
The Supreme Court’s conflicting and tortured treatment of arbitration is in
full view in its decision of Preston v. Ferrer.29 In Preston, a California law
granted a state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising
under California’s laws regarding talent agents.30 In holding that the FAA
preempts the state law granting exclusive jurisdiction to the state commissioner, the Court in Preston quoted from and relied on its Southland decision to
demonstrate that the FAA, as a substantive law applicable in both state and federal courts, preempts state laws undermining this substantive right to enforce an
arbitration agreement.31 The Southland strand conceives the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement as a substantive right under federal law,32 and Preston relied on this strand of arbitration law to justify the expansive displacement of
state law that occurs in Preston.33
The Supreme Court’s displacement of state law in Preston is breathtaking
in scope. The underlying dispute at issue involved a state law concern unique to
California: the licensing of talent agents in California’s entertainment industry.34 To carry out and enforce these state rights, and resolve disputes regarding
these state-created rights, California bestowed a state agency with the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear these special disputes.35 States should have sovereign authority to control the procedures by which their very own state-created rights
are enforced, and federal intrusion on how a state chooses to enforce its own
state-created rights raises serious federalism concerns.36 As a result of the Preston case, which flows from the Court’s substantive conceptualization of the enforcement of arbitration agreements in Southland, states can no longer design
and require specialized administrative tribunals with exclusive jurisdiction to
implement fundamental state policies and resolve disputes arising solely under
state law. This Preston case reflects and is based on the view that the enforcement of an arbitration clause is a substantive right created by Congress under
the FAA.
29

Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
Id. at 351.
31
Id. at 353.
32
Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
33
Preston, 552 U.S. at 353.
34
Id. at 354–55.
35
Id. at 351.
36
Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931) (“[T]he
procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied is peculiarly a subject of
state regulation and control,” and states have broad, exclusive powers to adopt any procedure
for the enforcement of rights, as long as the procedure “satisfies the constitutional requirements of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.”).
30
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However, at the same time while embracing the substantive view of arbitration to displace the state law, the Preston Court is careful to highlight the
procedural nature of arbitration:
[The enforceability of an arbitration agreement] presents precisely and only a
question concerning the forum in which the parties’ dispute will be heard. . . . So
here, [the plaintiff, who must arbitrate,] relinquishes no substantive rights the
[California Talent Agencies Act] or other California law may accord him.37

In other words, while relying on the substantive conceptualization of the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement to justify preemption of state law, the
Preston Court simultaneously stresses that the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement is procedural in nature because an arbitration agreement does not set
forth any rules of decision or rules regulating life outside of the legal system.
Instead, an arbitration agreement simply identifies the method, forum, or process for enforcing substantive rights and resolving substantive disputes.38
Why did the Court in Preston go out of its way to highlight the procedural
nature of arbitration, while at the same time treating arbitration as substantive
in other parts of its opinion? Perhaps the Court was aware that its ruling would
raise serious federalism concerns and result in a severe displacement of state
law granting exclusive jurisdiction to a state administrative agency, and to help
alleviate such federalism concerns, the Court was careful to emphasize that only procedures were being changed and the parties’ substantive rights under state
law would not be impacted. The Court’s characterization of arbitration as procedural in nature suggests that an arbitration tribunal would be fully competent
to hear and resolve the claims at issue without impacting the substantive rights
of the parties. Perhaps, to alleviate concerns arising from the severe displacement of state law, the Court in Preston relied on the procedural nature of arbitration to suggest that the same outcome should occur regardless of whether the
case is heard in an arbitral forum or before a special state commissioner. It is
almost as if the Court in Preston attempted to gloss over the serious federalism
concerns arising from its substantive treatment of arbitration by simultaneously
highlighting the procedural nature of arbitration.
In sum, there is significant tension in the Supreme Court’s conceptualization of arbitration. In some cases, the enforcement of an arbitration agreement
is treated as a substantive right, and in other cases, or even within the same
case, the Court stresses that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is procedural in nature.

37
38

Preston, 552 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id.
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II. RESOLVING THE TENSION IN THE SUPREME COURT’S ARBITRATION
DECISIONS BY SITUATING ARBITRATION WITHIN A BROADER PROCEDURAL
FRAMEWORK
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its
conceptualization of arbitration agreement enforcement.39 How should this tension in arbitration law be resolved? One can easily resolve this tension in the
Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions by properly situating arbitration law
within a broader procedural framework. When arbitration is properly viewed as
part of a broader procedural framework for resolving disputes, it becomes clear
that the substantive treatment of arbitration in the Supreme Court’s Southland
decision is flawed.
The history of the FAA’s enactment, which demonstrates that the FAA was
part of a larger movement for improving the administration of justice and reforming the judicial system, helps confirm the procedural nature of arbitration.40 During the early 1900s, the federal court system was broken, confusing,
hypertechnical, and overwhelmed, necessitating a movement for procedural reform developed to cope with the problems plaguing the judicial system.41 There
was a strong desire to reform procedures to make the resolution of disputes
more efficient and streamlined; the FAA’s enactment was part of this broader
movement for procedural reform and improving the administration of justice.42
Viewing the FAA within its broader context of a larger movement of procedural reform, both in the courts and in arbitration, helps one see more clearly the
procedural nature of the FAA, contrary to the Supreme Court’s treatment of arbitration in the Southland case.
In addition to the history of the FAA’s enactment as part of a broader
movement of procedural reform, the text of the FAA, the original understanding of the FAA, constitutional concerns, and the concept of arbitration all
demonstrate that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement should be treated
as procedural in nature. The late Professor Ian Macneil, in his ground-breaking
book, American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationalization, already conclusively and thoroughly confirmed that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Southland is deeply flawed because the FAA is procedural.43
Professor Macneil’s key arguments are summarized below.
In his landmark book, Professor Macneil observed that the FAA is a fully
integrated, unitary statute designed to facilitate the different stages of arbitration—the FAA addresses the beginning of an arbitration proceeding, the arbitration proceeding itself, as well as post-award issues.44 The Supreme Court in
39
40
41
42
43
44

See supra Part I.
SZALAI, supra note 25, at 166–79.
Id.
Id.
See generally MACNEIL, supra note 23.
Id. at 105–07.
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Southland reached its flawed holding by narrowly focusing on one section of
the statute.45 However, when one properly considers the entire statute as a comprehensive, unitary framework designed to facilitate all stages of commercial
arbitration, it becomes immediately apparent that the FAA is a statute applicable solely in federal courts because the FAA is filled with references to the federal courts.46 The fully integrated nature of the FAA and the FAA’s explicit references to federal courts make clear that, as a textual matter, Southland is
wrongly decided; the FAA was never intended to be a substantive law applicable in state courts.47
Furthermore, at the time of the FAA’s enactment during the 1920s, the
universal understanding of arbitration law was that it was procedural law.48 As
recognized in a House Report,
[w]hether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of
procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought
and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in
which the contract is made. Before such contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is essential.49

Also, as explained above in the discussion regarding Preston, the FAA
raises serious federalism concerns because of its displacement of state law.50 As
a result of Southland’s flawed conceptualization of arbitration as a substantive
right and the Supreme Court’s decision in Preston, states have lost their sovereign authority to design exclusive, specialized, unique administrative tribunals
to implement fundamental state policies and resolve disputes arising solely under state law.51
Furthermore, the concept or definition of arbitration helps demonstrate the
procedural nature of arbitration. Why do parties arbitrate? No one arbitrates in
the abstract. Arbitration should be conceptualized as a bundle of procedures
45

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1984).
See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court. . . .”); 9 U.S.C. § 7 (“[I]f any person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States district court
for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel the
attendance of such person. . . .”); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (“In any of the following cases the United
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award. . . .”).
47
MACNEIL, supra note 23, 105–07.
48
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 286–89 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49
H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924); MACNEIL, supra note 23, at 117.
50
See supra notes 34–41 and accompanying text; see generally Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S.
346 (2008).
51
Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative
Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 115–18, 136–37 (2015) (stating FAA’s preemptive impact on state administrative schemes violates constitutional guarantees of federalism).
46

18 NEV. L.J. 511, SZALAI - FINAL

Winter 2018]

3/27/18 5:34 PM

RECONCILING FAULT LINES

521

used to resolve a dispute; arbitration occurs in connection with an underlying
dispute to be resolved, as recognized by the Supreme Court’s procedural treatment of arbitration in Vaden v. Discover Bank.52 Arbitration is a procedural tool
to enforce or resolve disputes about substantive rights, but arbitration itself
does not define one’s substantive rights.53 Arbitration law does not regulate or
impact one’s conduct outside of the context of resolving a dispute.54 The very
notion of arbitration, as a method or bundle of procedures to enforce or resolve
disputes about substantive rights, reinforces the procedural nature of arbitration.
The vacillation and inconsistencies of the Supreme Court in conceptualizing arbitration also help confirm that something is amiss with the Court’s holding in Southland. Although the Court has held in several cases that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is a substantive right,55 the Court in other
cases cannot avoid admitting or facing the reality that arbitration is procedural,
not substantive law. For example, in Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Court held
that federal courts must look through to the underlying merits dispute to determine whether the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement.56 This “look through” approach adopted in Vaden recognizes the reality that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is merely a
procedural tool or a process designed to resolve the underlying merits dispute
between the parties. If the enforcement of an arbitration clause were truly a
substantive right, as the erroneous Southland decision holds,57 then the enforcement of an arbitration clause would automatically give rise to federal
question subject matter jurisdiction. Normally, a substantive right arising under
federal law would automatically create federal question subject matter jurisdiction.58 However, as demonstrated in Vaden, federal courts do not have automatic subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement; instead, the
Supreme Court in Vaden recognized that courts must “look through” and examine the underlying merits dispute to be resolved in arbitration in order to determine whether the court has jurisdiction to enforce this critical federal substan52

Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009); see also infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
53
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) (“We have held that federal
statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements that are enforceable pursuant to
the FAA because the agreement only determines the choice of forum.”); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”).
54
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
difference between substantive laws and procedural laws involves rules that substantially
impact “primary decisions respecting human conduct” outside the context of dispute resolution and rules that shape the conduct of dispute resolution).
55
See supra Section I.A.
56
Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62.
57
See supra notes 8–19 and accompanying text.
58
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
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tive right.59 Confronted with this problem of a substantive law that fails to give
rise to federal question jurisdiction, the Court in Vaden and in other cases has
been forced to bluntly admit that the FAA is “something of an anomaly” in the
entire field of federal subject matter jurisdiction.60 The Court glosses over the
dissonance of a purported substantive federal right failing to give rise to subject
matter jurisdiction by labeling and dismissing the problem as an “anomaly.”61
In other words, the Supreme Court acknowledges that its treatment of arbitration as a substantive right creates a major aberration and problem in the field of
subject matter jurisdiction, yet, dismisses its flawed treatment with an “is-whatit-is” attitude with no further explanation or attempt to reconcile the jurisdictional problem.
However, instead of quickly dismissing the FAA’s jurisdictional issue as
an inexplicable aberration that fails to comport with the rest of subject matter
jurisdiction, the better resolution of this jurisdictional puzzle is that the enforcement of an arbitration clause is not a substantive federal right. Instead, the
FAA is a procedural law. Properly recognized as a procedural law, the FAA
does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction. No matter how many times
the Court relies on the substantive nature of arbitration to preempt and displace
state law, the Court, from time to time, must uncomfortably confront the inescapable reality that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is merely procedural.62 The flip-flopping nature of the Court’s characterization of arbitration
and the Court’s inability to explain the “anomaly” involving the jurisdictional
problems created by the Court’s substantive characterization emphasize the
Court’s erroneous treatment of arbitration as a federal substantive right.
In sum, the Court’s conceptualization of the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement as a federal substantive right is highly problematic in light of the
history of the FAA’s enactment as part of a broader movement of procedural
reform, the text of the FAA, the meaning of arbitration, and serious federalism
and jurisdictional problems. Properly viewing the FAA through a procedural
lens resolves this tension in arbitration law. The enforcement of an arbitration
clause involves procedural, not substantive, law.

59

Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62 (“The text of § 4 drives our conclusion that a federal court should
determine its jurisdiction by ‘looking through’ a § 4 petition to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy.”).
60
Id. at 59; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983) (“The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to
honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise.”).
61
Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59.
62
See supra Section I.B.
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III. REDEFINING ARBITRATION BY EXAMINING ARBITRATION THROUGH A
PROCEDURAL LENS
As explained above in Part II, despite the Court’s inconsistent and flawed
conceptualizations of arbitration, the enforcement of an arbitration agreement
should be viewed as procedural. What ramifications flow from this principle
that arbitration is procedural in nature? Exploring arbitration through a broader
lens of procedure suggests ways to improve arbitration law and redefine arbitration. Viewing arbitration as procedural demonstrates that the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Southland is wrongly decided; clarifies the role of
arbitration as an integrated part of our broader legal system; sharpens policy
debates about the future of arbitration law; and suggests a way to redefine arbitration in our laws.
A. States Should Be Free to Experiment in Regulating Arbitration Because
Southland is Wrongly Decided
Because the enforcement of an arbitration clause is procedural in nature,
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Southland and its progeny are seriously
flawed.63 States should be free to decide for themselves whether and under
what conditions an arbitration clause is fully enforceable.64 The fact that an arbitration agreement may not be fully enforceable under state law, while the
same clause would be fully enforceable under the FAA in federal court, is not
problematic. To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi, an agreement to
arbitrate is just a change in forum and procedures.65 Litigating instead of arbitrating a dispute would involve differences in process costs and procedures, to
be sure, but switching fora would not be the end of the world. Having different
fora for the resolution of disputes is inherent in the nature of our federalist system. Forum shopping and having disputes resolved pursuant to different procedural rules already occurs in the United States’ judicial systems when parties,
without an arbitration clause, forum shop among different state court systems
or when parties desire to remain in state court and intentionally craft their complaints to avoid triggering subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. The fact
that one government entity would be willing to enforce an arbitration clause, a
procedural question, while another government entity would not enforce the
same clause, should not impact the substantive rights of parties. When arbitration is properly understood and treated as procedural law, such acknowledg63

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984).
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 82–85, 121 (2013) (sacrificing
the uniformity values of Southland would promote federalism values in the regulation of arbitration).
65
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It
trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”).
64
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ment of the procedural nature of arbitration should free states to experiment
with regulating arbitration in different ways.
B. Arbitration is an Integrated Part of Our Broader Legal System
Understanding that arbitration is procedural, and that the FAA’s enactment
was part of a broader movement for procedural reform highlights the role of
arbitration within our broader legal system. The push for the FAA and the push
for a uniform set of rules for the federal court system in the early decades of the
twentieth century were part of the same larger movement for procedural reform, and these procedural developments grew out of the broken court system
of the early 1900s.66 This background helps stress the role of the FAA and arbitration as an integrated part of our broader legal system.67 The private systems
of arbitration supported by the FAA serve as a safety valve for an overburdened, broken court system.68 Also, arbitration serves as a competitive, contrasting foil to the traditional court system. If the courts are not functioning
well, parties can take their disputes to private arbitration, and procedural innovations in arbitration can influence the reform of court procedures.69 In other
words, viewing arbitration as part of a broader movement for procedural reform
helps reveal that different systems of dispute resolution are interrelated, and a
robust system of arbitration can be healthy for a smoothly functioning court
system.70
C. Improving and Redefining Arbitration
1. The Transsubstantive Nature of Modern Arbitration Law
Understanding that arbitration is procedural in nature sharpens policy debates about arbitration, which suggests ways to improve and redefine arbitration under the FAA. Today, as a result of the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretations of the FAA, the FAA is a broadly applicable procedural law of a
transsubstantive nature, and this final section of the Article explores the ramifications of such a procedural law.
The FAA, which is textually limited to written provisions in a contract to
arbitrate disputes arising out of the contract,71 was originally designed to cover
contractual disputes between merchants of relatively co-equal bargaining pow-

66

SZALAI, supra note 25, at 166–73.
Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History,
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 130–34.
68
Id. at 132.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 134.
71
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract” are fully enforceable).
67
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er.72 The FAA’s legislative history helps demonstrate that the statute was not
designed for take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements imposed by a stronger
party on a weaker party.73 By the very terms of the statute, which is limited to
disputes arising out of a contract, the FAA was never intended to cover statutory claims or tort claims that could be asserted without reference to a contract.74
Properly limited to contractual, commercial disputes, the FAA, as originally
enacted, embodied a type of substance-specific model of procedural regulation.
However, in a series of cases, beginning in the international context in the
1970s and expanding to the domestic context in the 1980s, the Supreme Court
transformed the FAA into a transsubstantive procedural statute and broadly expanded the FAA to cover virtually every area of non-criminal law.75 Ignoring
the clear text of the FAA, the Supreme Court has created a default rule that every possible claim, statutory or non-statutory, is now subject to the FAA’s coverage, unless Congress clearly provides otherwise.76 Moreover, courts today
routinely apply the FAA to complex statutory claims, sexual battery claims,
and wrongful death claims—claims that can be stated without reference to a
contract and that were never intended to be covered by the statute as originally
enacted.77 Furthermore, employment disputes were never intended to be cov-

72

Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before
the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924) (statement of Charles L.
Bernheimer, Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York) (FAA designed for disputes such as one between a seller of a carload of potatoes
from Wyoming and a dealer from New Jersey); see also id. at 30–31 (statement of Wilson J.
Vance, Secretary, New Jersey Chamber of Commerce) (arbitration legislation would help
reduce “business litigation” and encourage “business men” to settle their “business differences”); id. at 41 (“If business men desire to submit their disputes to speedy and expert decision, why should they not be enabled to do so?”). The statute was designed for merchants
who could bargain for the inclusion of an arbitration agreement as part of their transactions
with one another, and a prototypical dispute covered by the FAA would be a commercial
dispute about the quality of shipped goods between merchants in different states.
73
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9–11 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
74
9 U.S.C. § 2 (FAA covers written provisions in a contract “to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract”).
75
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (FAA covers
all types of statutory claims, including civil rights claims, unless Congress specifically exempts a particular statutory claim from arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 510–11, 519–20 (1974).
76
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626–28; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519–20.
77
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532–34 (2012) (wrongful death
claims); In re Online Travel Co., 953 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720–21 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (antitrust
claims); Anderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d at 687, 695 (E.D. La. 2013) (employee’s claims for sexual harassment and assault); IFMG Sec., Inc. v. Sewell, No. 13-1000235-CV, 2011 WL 5515528, at *3 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2011) (employee’s claims for sexual harassment, assault, and battery).
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ered by the FAA,78 but in 2001, the Supreme Court expanded the statute to
cover employment disputes.79 The Supreme Court has broadly expanded the
FAA far beyond its original intent so that the statute applies to all types of disputes.
With the increasing, expansive coverage of the FAA, the Supreme Court
has fully transformed the FAA from a substance-specific procedural law covering contractual, commercial disputes into a transsubstantive procedural law
covering all types of disputes.80 Scholars have debated the virtues of substancespecific versus transsubstantive models of procedural regulation.81 Although
substance-specificity in procedural rules can lead to more tailored procedures
designed to better implement the policies of each area of substantive law, substance-specificity can lead to greater complexity in procedural law and wrangling over which body of procedural law controls.82 A universal, transsubstantive model of procedural law, with its simplicity and flexibility, has its own
inherent appeal and has dominated the modern federal civil procedure system
through the “one-size-fits-all” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Perhaps, the
Supreme Court’s decisions expanding the coverage of the FAA to all types of
disputes was influenced, at least in part, by the norm of transsubstantivity found
in the governing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
How does the substance-specific vs. transsubstantive debate apply in the
context of the FAA? In other words, in developing and improving arbitration
law for the future, should the current transsubstantive norm continue to apply in
arbitration law, or should arbitration law become more substance-specific?
There is no easy answer to this policy choice. A reasonable proposal to reform
the FAA is to move away from the transsubstantive nature of the FAA by de78

SZALAI, supra note 25, at 191–92 (examining historical evidence demonstrating that the
FAA was never intended to apply to employment disputes).
79
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
80
Arbitration rules set forth in a particular agreement or developed by an arbitration institution can be, and often are, substance-specific. For example, the American Arbitration Association has rules designed for employment disputes and a separate set of rules designed for
construction disputes. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N., EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURE (2016); AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2016). Although particular arbitration
rules used in an arbitration proceeding may be focused and substance-specific, the FAA procedural law regulating and facilitating the use of arbitration has grown to be transsubstantive
and applies broadly to every type of arbitration proceeding, such as consumer, employment,
construction, or complex commercial arbitration proceedings.
81
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2067–68 (1989); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the
Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Problem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 78 (1994); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive
Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
377, 377 (2010) (“I have argued for three decades that the underlying transsubstantive philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is flawed.”).
82
Carrington, supra note 81, at 2081.
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veloping more substance-specific arbitration law as well as different rules for
distinctive settings or uses of arbitration. For example, to be more protective of
consumer and employee rights, a rational proposal would be to better tailor arbitration law to implement the policies of consumer protection statutes and employment statutes. One could develop heightened standards of meaningful consent for consumer and employment arbitration agreements. Another reform
could involve increasing the level of judicial review for statutory claims involving consumer and employment disputes. To the contrary, perhaps the FAA
could become very substance-specific and be limited solely to contractual disputes between merchants, as originally intended, and be amended to exclude
consumer, employment, and statutory claims from its coverage.83
2. Risks of a Transsubstantive Model of Arbitration Law
Although the simplicity of a transsubstantive model of procedure is appealing, there is a risk that a universal procedural rule may be applied in a harsh,
inflexible, and unfair manner. For example, in the field of federal civil procedure governing the courts, the Supreme Court’s landmark pleading decisions in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly have made some people
question the continued wisdom of transsubstantive procedural rules.84 In Iqbal
and Twombly, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal pleading standard as
requiring that there must be sufficient factual allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint to make a claim “plausible.”85 Several scholars believe this standard of
plausibility pleading represents a departure from a more liberal system of notice pleading adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938.86 Plausibility pleading has been criticized as an improper, judicially created, more
heightened form of detailed pleading not required by the Federal Rules.87 In the
wake of Iqbal and Twombly, commentators have criticized the impact of the
plausibility pleading standards in cases where defendants are likely to be in exclusive possession of evidence of wrongdoing, such as civil rights and employment discrimination cases, and commentators have also called into ques-

83

See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
85
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
86
Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton
Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1, 17
(2008) (“The Twombly holding marks a significant retreat from the concept of notice pleading and certainly the end of notice pleading as envisioned by the drafters of the Federal
Rules.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008) (Supreme Court’s plausibility standard is “quite at odds with the Court’s position heretofore”
and is a “break from the Court’s previous embrace of notice pleading.”).
87
Spencer, supra note 86, at 433.
84
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tion the values of transsubstantive procedures in light of the harsh, disparate
impact of the new pleading standard on certain types of substantive cases.88
As demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s controversial Twombly and Iqbal
decisions, there is a risk that “one-size-fits-all” universal procedural rules are
not nuanced enough and can be applied in a harsh, unfair manner to undermine
the enforcement of substantive laws. Similarly, consider the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,89 where the Court announced
a seemingly transsubstantive procedural law under the FAA, which could have
a harsh, disparate impact on certain types of cases. Rent-A-Center involved a
delegation clause, by which the parties to an arbitration agreement delegated to
an arbitrator the authority to resolve issues about the formation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement.90 The Supreme Court in Rent-A-Center held that
challenges to an arbitration agreement do not invalidate a narrow, specific delegation clause within an arbitration agreement.91 As a result, an arbitrator will
resolve challenges to the enforcement of an arbitration clause, and if an arbitration agreement contains arguably unconscionable terms, an arbitrator instead of
a court will determine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable.92 It
seems that the Court’s holding in Rent-A-Center, although transsubstantive on
its face and applicable to all types of cases, could have a harsh, disparate impact on consumer and employment cases. When two sophisticated parties have
relatively equal bargaining power, they may negotiate the terms of an arbitration clause, and with such meaningful consent, it is unlikely that one party
would be harmed by an unfair, harsh clause. In other words, the Rent-A-Center
holding may have less of an impact on two sophisticated parties who negotiate
and consent to all of the details of an arbitration agreement. However, in the
consumer and employment context, where meaningful consent is often lacking,
there may be harsh terms in the arbitration agreement drafted by a stronger corporate party, and under the Rent-A-Center decision, an arbitrator—instead of a
court—will determine the enforceability of the arbitration agreement if the arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause.93 Consumers and employees are
88

See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 517, 570 (2010) (“We have to recognize the disparate impact of transsubstantive procedure on civil rights and discrimination claims.”); Scott Foster, Note, Breaking the
Transsubstantive Pleading Mold: Public Interest Environmental Litigation After Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 885, 885–86 (2011) (explaining that the
transsubstantive plausibility pleading standard is inappropriate for public interest environmental litigation).
89
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 72.
92
See, e.g., Lloyd v. BRSI, LLC, No. CIV-15-964-M, 2016 WL 234861, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 19, 2016) (enforcing a delegation clause in arbitration agreement); Williams v. Omainsky, No. 15-0123-WS-N, 2015 WL 8056142, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2015) (enforcing a
delegation clause in arbitration agreement).
93
See Lloyd, 2016 WL 234861, at *2; Williams, 2015 WL 8056142, at *6.
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the parties who are more likely to be involved with challenges to harsh terms of
a one-sided arbitration clause since sophisticated parties with bargaining power
are probably more likely to have the ability to protect themselves in negotiating
an arbitration agreement.
Vulnerable consumers or employees would likely benefit from the broader
procedural protections available in court when litigating the issue of an arbitration clause’s enforceability, as opposed to having an arbitrator resolve the issue. For example, broader discovery would likely be available in court and allow parties to conduct depositions or engage in other discovery regarding the
making of an arbitration agreement. Also, by having courts decide these
threshold issues of whether a valid agreement exists in the consumer and employment context, a body of published and publicly available decisions will develop regarding the enforceability and fairness of certain provisions in an arbitration clause. These judicial decisions would generally be subject to appellate
review, which could promote consistency in the judicial decisions. Furthermore, in the consumer and employment settings, when a court enforces a delegation clause such that an arbitrator will resolve the enforceability of harsh
terms in an arbitration clause, such decisions may undermine public confidence
in the judicial system. An injured victim of discrimination or a consumer who
has been cheated may feel that the courts have harshly shut the door because
the courts will not hear the underlying dispute and to add insult to injury, the
courts will not even strike down an obviously harsh or unfair arbitration provision. Instead, it would be up to the arbitrator to review the harsh provision and
perhaps merely sever the harsh provision from the rest of the arbitration clause.
The “one-size-fits-all” rule regarding delegation clauses created by the Supreme Court’s Rent-A-Center decision, although transsubstantive on its face,
would appear to have a harsher impact in certain types of cases.
Another example of the harshness of a transsubstantive arbitration law involves judicial vacatur of arbitral awards. Historically, the grounds for judicial
vacatur of an arbitral award have been very narrow and courts have sometimes
described this level of review as the narrowest review known in American
law.94 When the FAA was first enacted during the 1920s, this narrow level of
review may have been appropriate for contractual disputes about the quality of
goods shipped between two merchants of relatively co-equal bargaining power
who understood the finality of arbitration and willingly consented to this system. However, with the Supreme Court’s transsubstantive expansion of the
FAA, critical statutory claims of public interest, such as civil rights claims, are
now captured under the finality of arbitration developed for contractual disputes, and instead of a one-size-fits-all arbitration law, a rational argument

94

Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 2008) (“A federal
court’s review of an arbitrator’s decision, however, is extremely narrow and exceedingly
deferential. Indeed, it is among the narrowest known in the law.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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could be made for a more substance-specific arbitration law with increased judicial review of arbitral awards involving consumer or employment claims.
3. Redefining the Meaning of Arbitration under the FAA Through the
Lens of Procedure
Although reasonable arguments could be advanced for a more substancespecific model of arbitration law, the track record of arbitration reform in Congress is not encouraging for any substantial legislative reforms of America’s
arbitration laws.95 It is unlikely that significant reforms to arbitration law will
take place any time soon, and it looks like a transsubstantive model of arbitration law may be here to stay for the foreseeable future. Thus, if the United
States legal system must continue with a transsubstantive model of arbitration
law, what are the ramifications?
If America’s arbitration laws remain transsubstantive, it is important that
the procedural law embodied in the FAA be flexible enough so that the FAA
would be applied in a fair manner and not undermine the policies and enforcement of substantive rights. Although the relationship between substance and
procedure is complex, at least one major goal or value of procedural law that
has been advanced over time is that procedural law should be subordinate to the
goals of substantive justice.96 Procedural rules can be justified by “their effectiveness in making easier and surer the application of the principles of substantive law.”97 There is a strong view that procedural rules should be supportive of
substantive rights and not frustrate the enforcement of substantive rights.98 To
help justify the legal system in the public’s eye, an individual’s rights should
not be undermined by the flawed procedural enforcement of those rights.
The Supreme Court has already recognized to some degree in its arbitration
cases that procedural law should be subordinate to substantive law. In its landmark case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the
Court issued one of its strongest statements about the procedural nature of arbitration.99 In holding that complex statutory antitrust claims are arbitrable under
the FAA, the Court characterized arbitration agreements as a type of forum selection clause setting forth “not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to
be used in resolving the dispute.”100 In addressing concerns that an arbitration
tribunal would not be adequate to handle complex claims or implement the
95

Several bills, called the Arbitration Fairness Act, have been introduced in Congress over
the years in order to amend the FAA, but the bills have died out in committee. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of
2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).
96
See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938).
97
Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J. 67, 68 (1927).
98
Clark, supra note 96, at 304; Clark, supra note 97, at 67–68; see also Roscoe Pound, The
Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 602 (1926).
99
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
100
Id. at 630 (citation omitted).
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goals of antitrust law, the Court made the following critical statement: “And so
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum, the [federal antitrust] statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent function.”101 This statement in Mitsubishi, which
sets forth what has been called the “effective vindication” doctrine, recognizes
the normative principle that arbitration, or procedural law in general, should not
undermine substantive law.
It is important to recognize the context in which the Court proclaimed the
effective vindication doctrine. The FAA was originally intended to apply only
to commercial, contractual disputes arising out of a contract.102 Statutory rights,
which do not arise out of a contract, were not intended to be covered by the
statute. In Mitsubishi, and in a series of other cases, the Court expanded the
scope of the FAA to cover statutory claims.103 Thus, in Mitsubishi, the Court
was breaking into new territory and expanding the FAA, and to alleviate concerns about this expansion to complex statutory claims, the Court announced
the effective vindication doctrine.104 The Court was in effect saying that there is
no need to worry about the expansion of the FAA; arbitration of statutory
claims is entirely appropriate. By announcing the effective vindication doctrine,
the Court recognized a parameter or limit to arbitration: arbitration of statutory
claims will not be allowed if the arbitration process undermines the enforcement of substantive laws. The effective vindication doctrine was announced or
recognized in the particular context of this case to help justify the Court’s judicial expansion of the FAA to cover statutory claims.
Since the announcement of the effective vindication doctrine in 1986 in
Mitsubishi, lower courts have used the effective vindication doctrine to monitor
the fairness of arbitration agreements and strike down harsh, one-sided provisions in such agreements. For example, in the case of Gourley v. Yellow
Transp., LLC, the arbitration agreement contained three separate harsh terms,
which frustrated the ability of employees to assert sexual harassment claims.105
At the front end, the agreement imposed excessive fees on the plaintiffs who
could not afford to pay.106 The district court, citing precedent that arbitration
agreements cannot prevent parties from effectively vindicating their rights, held
that the excessive fees would prevent the parties from fully enforcing their
rights.107 Similarly, in the middle, the agreement restricted the arbitration hearing to one day, with the possibility of two days for “unusual circumstances and
101

Id. at 637.
See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
103
Id.
104
Imre Stephen Szalai, More than Class Action Killers: The Impact of Concepcion and
American Express on Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 31, 56 n.176
(2014).
105
Gourley v. Yellow Transp., LLC, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Colo. 2001).
106
Id. at 1203–04.
107
Id.
102
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good cause shown.”108 Because of the complexity of the case, the district court
found that the one or two-day limitation for hearings made the arbitral forum
inadequate for the plaintiffs to vindicate their rights.109 Furthermore, at the back
end, the agreement prohibited the plaintiffs from submitting post-hearing evidence, which would prevent the plaintiffs from vindicating their right to the
statutory award of attorneys’ fees in cases arising under federal civil rights
laws.110 In sum, for all three stages of the arbitration proceeding, the beginning,
middle, and end, the arbitration clause at issue contained harsh, one-sided terms
that prevented the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their rights, and the
district court easily concluded that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable.111
Although the effective vindication doctrine was a well-established and useful principle of arbitration law for decades following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi in 1985, the Supreme Court unfortunately undermined the
effective vindication doctrine, designating it to be mere dicta, in the 2013 case
of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.112 In this case, merchants filed a class action lawsuit in court to challenge certain credit card fees
of American Express as violations of federal antitrust law.113 In response to the
lawsuit, American Express asked the court to compel each merchant to arbitrate
individually pursuant to arbitration clauses in the contracts between the merchants and American Express.114 The arbitration clauses contained class-action
waivers forbidding the merchants from proceeding collectively as a class.115
However, if each merchant had to bring individual proceedings, the costs of
proving the antitrust claims through expert witnesses could reach more than $1
million, which would easily exceed a potential individual recovery of perhaps
$40,000.116 In other words, if forced to bring individual arbitration proceedings,
the merchants could not effectively vindicate their rights. The appellate court
held that the arbitration agreements were not enforceable because the agreements prevented the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their rights.117
In a majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that
under the FAA, courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements on the
grounds that the agreements do not permit collective or class claims.118 Reasoning that arbitration agreements must be enforced as written pursuant to the
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 1204.
Id.
Id. at 1204–05.
Id. at 1205.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).
Id. at 2308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2309–10.
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FAA, the Court found that the class-action waiver was fully enforceable.119
Turning to a discussion of the antitrust laws, the Court explained that the antitrust laws do not prevent class-action waivers, and in fact, the federal antitrust
laws were enacted decades before the modern class-action rule was even adopted, which suggests that the individual resolution of antitrust claims is not problematic.120 In the final section of the majority opinion, the Court addressed and
dismissed arguments about the effective vindication doctrine.121
Regarding the effective vindication doctrine, the majority quickly dismissed the doctrine as “judge-made” and mere “dictum” originating in the
Mitsubishi case.122 The majority described the doctrine as designed to “prevent
‘prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.’ ”123 With
such a definition of the effective vindication doctrine, the majority opined that
the doctrine would invalidate “a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights.”124 Also, the doctrine “would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high
as to make access to the forum impracticable.”125 However, according to the
majority, the high cost of “proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”126 As a result, the effective vindication doctrine did not apply in this case. Even though the class-action waiver
would make it economically irrational for anyone to bring individual antitrust
claims, because a rational person would not spend $1 million to recover
$40,000, the class-action waiver was fully enforceable.127
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote a dissent.128
Justice Kagan explained that the effective vindication doctrine, instead of being
mere dictum, was critical to the holding of Mitsubishi: “We held [in Mitsubishi]
that federal statutory claims are subject to arbitration ‘so long as’ the claimant
‘effectively may vindicate its [rights] in the arbitral forum.’ The rule thus
served as an essential condition of the decision’s holding.”129 Also, pursuant to
this doctrine, Justice Kagan argued that the class-action waiver in this case is
not enforceable. Justice Kagan explained that an explicit exculpatory clause
barring the assertion of a federal claim would clearly be unenforceable as an
improper prospective waiver of one’s rights.130 However, as observed by Jus119

Id. at 2309.
Id.
121
Id. at 2310–12.
122
Id. at 2310.
123
Id. (emphasis omitted).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 2310–11.
126
Id. at 2311.
127
Id. at 2308, 2310, 2312.
128
Id. at 2313.
129
Id. at 2317 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985)).
130
Id. at 2314.
120
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tice Kagan, there are several other ways a stronger party can in effect bring
about the same immunity and frustrate the vindication of one’s rights throughout the different stages of an arbitration proceeding:
On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish an
absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from
gaining access to the arbitral forum. On the back end: The agreement might remove the arbitrator’s authority to grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment
gets the claimant nothing worthwhile. And in the middle: The agreement might
block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is necessary to establish the defendant’s liability—say, by prohibiting any economic testimony (good
luck proving an antitrust claim without that!). Or else the agreement might appoint as an arbitrator an obviously biased person—say, the CEO of Amex. The
possibilities are endless—all less direct than an express exculpatory clause, but
no less fatal.131

Instead of being limited to just prospective waivers of the right to pursue or
assert a claim from the very beginning, Justice Kagan treated the effective vindication doctrine as broadly applicable to a variety of different arbitration stages.132 With this broader, more comprehensive view of the effective vindication
doctrine, Justice Kagan believed that the class-action waiver at issue, which
forced the merchants to bring individual claims, made the assertion of antitrust
claims cost-prohibitive, and thus the arbitration clause did not allow the parties
to vindicate their statutory rights.133
There is a tension between the majority’s and dissent’s view of the effective vindication doctrine. In addition to dismissing the doctrine as “judgemade” “dictum,” the majority appeared to suggest a narrow, restricted view of
the doctrine. The majority suggested the doctrine applies in one or perhaps two
situations: “prospective waiver[s]” of the right to sue (as opposed to procedural
provisions that made it more costly to prove a claim), and “perhaps” prohibitive
upfront “filing and administrative fees.”134 Lower courts, taking their cue from
131

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2317–18 (stating that “[the effective vindication doctrine] covers the world of other
provisions a clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most meritorious federal claims”
and providing several examples of harsh provisions).
133
Id. at 2320.
134
Id. at 2310–11. Justice Scalia mentioned “filing and administrative fees,” which probably
includes the fee to initiate an arbitration before an arbitration association and covers the administrative services provided by the arbitration association. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2016). (“Administrative
Fees: The AAA charges a filing fee based on the amount of the claim or counterclaim. This
fee information, which is included with these rules, allows the parties to exercise control
over their administrative fees. The fees cover AAA administrative services; they do not cover arbitrator compensation or expenses, if any, reporting services, or any post-award charges
incurred by the parties in enforcing the award.”) (emphasis added). In his definition of the
effective vindication doctrine, Justice Scalia noticeably did not mention the fees or expenses
of arbitrators, who may receive hourly or daily rates. An arbitrator’s fees would, of course,
vary depending on the complexity of the case and how much evidence or testimony a party
wishes to present; arbitrators’ fees would vary with the difficulty and time in presenting and
132
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the majority’s restrictive, weakened view of the effective vindication doctrine,
are also taking a narrow view of the doctrine in the wake of American Express.135 The dissent in American Express, on the other hand, adopted a more
comprehensive, robust, and flexible definition of the effective vindication doctrine. The dissent recognized that the doctrine would apply to any provision
that prevents the vindication of one’s rights, regardless of whether the provision
restricts access to the proceeding from the front end or very beginning, makes
the proceeding itself an inadequate forum, or restricts the grant of certain relief
at the back end.136
Justice Kagan’s broader view of the effective vindication is more appropriate for arbitration law than the stringent, limited view adopted by the majority.
As mentioned above, lower courts for several decades prior to the American
Express decision have applied the effective vindication doctrine to strike down
harsh provisions involving all stages of an arbitration proceeding, regardless of
whether the provision impacts the beginning, middle, or end of a proceeding.137
Justice Kagan’s broader, more comprehensive, robust view of the effective vindication doctrine represents a more realistic view of procedure as having the
ability to impact the resolution of a dispute at any stage of a proceeding.138 Kaproving a case. Based on Justice Scalia’s narrow view of the effective vindication doctrine,
which applies to prospective waivers of the right to sue and not provisions giving rise to
high, variable costs associated with proving a more complex case, an argument could be
made that high arbitrator’s fees are not covered by Justice Scalia’s crimped, weakened view
of the effective vindication doctrine, since arbitrator’s fees are likely to vary depending on
the complexity of proving a particular case. In other words, Justice Scalia’s choice of terms,
“administrative and filing fees,” may have been intended to exclude arbitrator’s fees from
the coverage of the effective vindication dictum, but this is not clear. Litigants and lower
courts have not, as of yet, explicitly relied on this aspect of Justice Scalia’s opinion and the
difference between “filing fees” and arbitrator’s fees to hold that the effective vindication
doctrine does not apply to excessive arbitrator’s fees. But see Byrd v. SunTrust Bank, No.
2:12-CV-02314-JPM-cgc, 2013 WL 3816714, at *18 (W.D. Tenn. July 22, 2013) (“[The Supreme Court’s American Express decision] appears to make it more difficult for Plaintiffs to
show that the Arbitration Clause is unenforceable due to high fees associated with arbitration.”).
135
Sierra v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int’l, N.V., 631 F. App’x 714, 718 (11th Cir.
2015) (relying on American Express’s treatment of the effective vindication doctrine as dictum to reject the application of the doctrine); Torres v. CleanNet, U.S.A., Inc., 90 F. Supp.
3d 369, 378 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (relying on American Express’s treatment of the effective vindication doctrine as dictum to find that the doctrine does not apply when the underlying merits
claims are based on state law); Mercado v. Doctors Med. Ctr. of Modesto, Inc., No.
F064478, 2013 WL 3892990, at *6, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2013) (finding that the American Express decision “narrowed the ability of courts to invalidate arbitration agreements on
the ground they inhibit or preclude vindication of statutory rights” and “cast[s] doubt on the
continued validity” of older FAA decisions).
136
Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2314.
137
See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text.
138
The landmark Erie doctrine from procedural law provides an interesting parallel and recognizes the principle that procedure, at any stage of a proceeding, may impact the resolution
of a dispute. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine and the effective vindication doctrine are of course different doctrines. The effective vindication doctrine
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gan’s more expansive view of the effective vindication doctrine is also important to help justify the fairness of arbitration proceedings as a legitimate,
appropriate method for resolving disputes and for furthering the policies and
enforcement of substantive law. It has been recognized that transsubstantive
procedural rules should embody flexibility, so that such procedural rules may
be fairly applied across a wide range of disputes.139 Because the FAA is
transsubstantive procedural law, Justice Kagan’s more flexible, broader view of
the effective vindication doctrine would help place courts in a better position to
police or monitor arbitration agreements to ensure that a harshly designed arbitration proceeding does not interfere or undermine the enforcement of substantive rights. If a judge completely rejects the effective vindication or applies a
weakened version of the doctrine because it is mere dicta, it will become more
difficult for courts to monitor arbitration clauses for fundamental fairness. Or if
a judge adopts a narrow view of the effective vindication doctrine as only applying to explicit exculpatory clauses, a judge may be unwilling to invalidate
harsh procedural terms, such as a limitation on testimony or damages. Especially in the setting of consumer and employment disputes, where meaningful consent is not likely to exist, a robust form of the effective vindication doctrine
can, at least, help level the playing field to some degree by providing some assurance of a minimal degree of fairness in the proceedings.

focuses on the appropriateness of an arbitral tribunal for the enforcement of substantive law.
The Erie doctrine is instead motivated by concerns about forum shopping due to differences
in procedures between state and federal court. However, Erie decisions to some degree reflect a concern that certain procedures are burdensome; Erie and its progeny recognize the
possibility that some procedures could be so game-changing or burdensome that they encourage forum shopping. Like Justice Kagan’s view of the effective vindication doctrine as
applying to all stages of an arbitration proceeding, Erie decisions reflect the reality that procedures could be burdensome or game-changing at any stage of a lawsuit. For example, the
Erie doctrine has been applied to requirements about the posting of security and statute of
limitations issues at the front end of litigation proceedings, issues regarding burden of proof
and expert witness testimony during the middle of the litigation proceedings, and limitations
on remedies at the end of proceedings. See, e.g., Gavin v. Club Holdings, LLC, No. 15-175RGA, 2016 WL 1298964 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016) (applying Erie in connection with state
law regarding statute of limitations); Buchwald v. Renco Grp., 539 B.R. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(applying Erie to limitation on damages); First Coast Energy, L.L.P. v. Mid-Continent Cas.
Co., 286 F.R.D. 630, 632 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (applying Erie to requirements about posting of
security bond); Burke v. Air Serv. Int’l, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying Erie and finding that state rule regarding expert witness testimony would “impose[] a
significant hurdle”); S. Union Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 581 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123, 124
(D. Mass. 2008) (applying Erie to burden of proof issues); Ilro Prods., Ltd. v. Music Fair Enters., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 76, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying Erie to requirements about posting of
security bond). The Erie doctrine, and its applicability to all stages of litigation, acknowledges the notion that procedures can have an impact at any stage of dispute resolution, a notion that is more consistent with Justice Kagan’s comprehensive view of the effective vindication doctrine than Justice Scalia’s more limited view.
139
Carrington, supra note 81, at 2081 (explaining flexibility and generalism are guiding
principles for transsubstantive rulemaking).
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Moving forward, how should arbitration law treat the effective vindication
doctrine? Contrary to the majority’s opinion in American Express, the doctrine
is not mere dictum. As pointed out by Justice Kagan in dissent, the effective
vindication doctrine formed a critical part of the holding in Mitsubishi.140 Furthermore, the effective vindication doctrine is more than just a part of the holding of Mitsubishi; one can argue that the effective vindication doctrine predates Mitsubishi and is enshrined within the FAA as part of the definition of the
arbitration. Procedural law, as a general rule, should be subordinate to, and not
interfere with, substantive rights. Similarly, as a procedural law, the FAA
should embody the effective vindication doctrine and not interfere with substantive rights in any manner. Courts should recognize that a broad and flexible
effective vindication doctrine is a critical component of the definition of arbitration under the FAA.
Although articulated and acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi, the effective vindication doctrine arguably has always been a part
of the FAA. The concept of effective vindication should be inherent in the very
meaning or definition of arbitration. Arbitration under the FAA embodies the
concept of the effective vindication doctrine. Consider the alternative, under
which the effective doctrine does not exist and is not embodied in the FAA.
Under such an alternative, the federal statute would support agreements that in
name appear to be a promise to arbitrate, but in practice, operate to suppress
claims or frustrate the resolution of claims. For example, suppose a purported
arbitration agreement sets forth a ridiculously short one-day statute of limitations. Such an agreement should not even be defined as arbitration under the
FAA, and as such, should not be enforceable under the FAA. A court refusing
to apply the effective vindication doctrine to this example because of the narrow reading given by the American Express majority, whereby the doctrine
would only apply to prospective waivers of the right to bring a claim, would be
elevating form over substance. By labelling the effective vindication doctrine to
be mere dicta, the majority in American Express is in effect saying the statute
provides for the enforcement of written provisions to arbitrate, pursuant to rules
that do not allow parties to effectively vindicate their rights. If the effective
vindication doctrine does not exist, as suggested by the majority’s treatment of
the doctrine as dictum in American Express, the FAA would mandate the enforcement of arbitration provisions that suppress claims and do not allow parties to effectively vindicate their rights. The enforcement of such written provisions providing de facto immunity would be absurd, and the effective
vindication doctrine should be inherent in the very meaning or definition of arbitration under the statute. Furthermore, by including the concept of effective
vindication in the very definition of arbitration under the FAA, one avoids the
140

Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (“We held [in Mitsubishi] that federal statutory claims
are subject to arbitration ‘so long as’ the claimant ‘effectively may vindicate its [rights] in
the arbitral forum.’ The rule thus served as an essential condition of the decision’s holding.”)
(citation omitted).
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problems associated with applying state law doctrines of unconscionability,
which may vary.141 To borrow a concept from the Supreme Court’s decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, where the Court opined about the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration, a fundamental attribute of arbitration should
be its ability to resolve disputes in good faith through an effective process for
the vindication of one’s rights.142 If an arbitration agreement contains harsh
terms that set forth an ineffective process and that frustrate the ability to vindicate one’s rights, such an agreement should not be considered arbitration under
the FAA.
CONCLUSION
By understanding the procedural nature of arbitration law, and borrowing
general principles of procedural law, such as the subordinate role of procedural
law within a legal system, one can thus redefine the concept of arbitration under the FAA.
The Supreme Court’s conceptualization of arbitration has been inconsistent, and significant problems have arisen from the Supreme Court’s treatment of arbitration as a substantive right. Viewing the enforcement of an arbitration clause as a substantive right obscures the true nature of arbitration law
and can hinder its proper development and role in our legal system. Viewing
the enforcement of an arbitration clause as a substantive right disturbs the proper balance and role of arbitration within our legal system, and such a flawed
view can threaten to steamroll over other rights. Framing the enforcement of an
arbitration clause as a substantive federal right creates or helps reinforce an impression that there is a prevailing, absolute right to enforce arbitration clauses
as written, at all costs, even if meaningful consent is lacking from weaker parties, even if harsh, unfair terms exist within an arbitration clause, and even if
enforcement results in an unconstitutional displacement of state’s rights. Treating arbitration law as a substantive right has led to the abuse of the arbitration
process and negative impressions of arbitration in society.143
However, as demonstrated by the procedural understanding of arbitration,
arbitration serves an invaluable, integrated role in our legal system and in our
141

Compare Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 2002)
(invalidating arbitration clause under California unconscionability doctrine), with Carter v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 2004) (enforcing the identical
arbitration clause under Texas unconscionability doctrine). By including the effective vindication doctrine as part of the definition of arbitration under the FAA, the doctrine would
provide greater protection for parties and apply in all cases where the FAA governs. See
Torres v. CleanNet, U.S.A., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 369, 378 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that the
effective vindication doctrine does not apply to state law claims).
142
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
143
See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/busin
ess/dealboo/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/C4V
R-ASD7].

18 NEV. L.J. 511, SZALAI - FINAL

Winter 2018]

3/27/18 5:34 PM

RECONCILING FAULT LINES

539

democratic society. Understanding arbitration as procedural in nature allows
one to see arbitration in a clearer, truer light and helps restore arbitration to its
proper role as supportive of one’s substantive rights. Well-established frameworks, considerations, or values developed for procedural law can be applied to
arbitration law to better understand and analyze arbitration doctrines, such as
the effective vindication doctrine. If we are able to peel away the substantive
mask created by the Court’s Southland decision, which is flawed and misleading, and if we instead recognize that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is procedural at its core, such a reconceptualization of arbitration within a
procedural framework allows one to focus more appropriately on arbitration
law, its role in society, and how it functions so it can be improved.
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